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HEGEL, PROVIDENCE, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
Karl Lowith, in his Meaning in Historyl argues that the Christian idea of Divine Providence gradually gave 
·way, around the titne of the Enlightenment in France and elsewhere, to the secularized notion that there is a 
kind of inevitable progress in history towards what is better and better. Included among the »secularizers« 
are Voltaire, Condorcet, Turgot, Hegel and other philosophers. Lowith casts their accomplishments in a 
negative light. What is this belief in endless progress but an unauthentic transference of the Christian belief 
in the coming of God's Kingdom to the purely secular sphere? Those intellectuals who found it difficult to 
believe in a final spiritual kingdom have, in Lowith' s estimation, settled upon the new worldly belief that 
humanity is progressing in every way - scientifically, technologically, culturally, even morally. 
Immanuel Kant did not share Lowith's misgivings. Living in the midst of the changes which Lowith 
castigates, Kant was much more sanguine about the value of the Enlightenment concept of progress. In his 
Philosophy of History, he presents progress as a viable rational cou.nterpart of the religious idea of Divine 
Providence, and as concerned specifically with the inevitable evolution of the nations of the world towards 
peace: 
»Here [ ... ] is a proposition valid for the most rigorous theory, in spite of all skeptics, and not just a 
well-meaning and practically commendable proposition: The human race has always been in progress 
toward the better and will continue to be so henceforth. To him who does not consider what happens in 
just some one nation but also has regard to the whole scope of all the peoples on earth who will gra-
dually come to participate in progress, this reveals the prospect of an immeasurable time[ ... ] The hope 
for [the human race's] progress is to be expected only on the condition of a wisdom from above 
·(which bears the name of Providence if it is invisible to us); but for that which can be expected and 
exacted from men in this area toward the advancement of this aim, we can anticipate only a negative 
wi.sdom, namely, that they will see themselves compelled to render [war] firstly by degrees more hu-
mane and then rarer, and finally to renounce offensive war altogether, in order to enter upon a consti-
tution which [ ... ]can persistently progress toward the better.«2 · 
Lowith, in sharp contrast, finds such conceptual conjunction of »Progress« (even construed as »negative 
wisdom«) with »Providence« regrettable - a watering-down of the religious experience of transcendence in-
culcated by Christianity, a dismaying orientation of human life to purely secular aspirations and expecta-
tions - over-optimistic expectations doomed to generate disappointment when they inevitably fall short of 
fulfillment. · · 
During the last century, the idea of constant progress has often been coupled with evolution, even 
though Darwin's theory of »natural selection« eschews any teleological interpretations, including expecta-
tions of progress. Nevertheless, some proponents of social evolution, branching off sharply from Darwin, 
have explicitly extrapolated the idea of the upward biological progress in the tree of evolution into over-
arching concepts of social and/or moral progress. A recent example is the French Jesuit paleontologist and 
· philosopher, Teilhard de Chardin, who observes: 
»We are sometimes inclined to think that the same things are monotonously repeated over and over 
again in the history of creation. That is because the season is too long by comparison with the brevity 
of our individual lives, and the transformation too vast and too inward by comparison with our super-
ficial and restricted outlook, for us to see the progress of what is tirelessly taking place in and through 
all matter and all spirit. «3 · · 
A similar theory of ethicaVspiritual evolution is propounded by M. Scott Peck in his best-selling book, The 
Road Less Travelled: 
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»The notion that the plane of mankind's spiritual development is in a process of ascension may h ardly 
seem realistic to a generation disillusioned with the dream of progress. Everywhere is war, corruption 
and pollution. How could one reasonably suggest that the hum~n race is spiritually progressing? Yet 
that is exactly what I suggest. Our very sense of disillusionment arises from the fact that we expect 
more of ourselves than our forebears did of themselves. Human behavior that we find repugnant and 
outrageous today was accepted as a matter of course yesteryear.«4 
Hegel, if he were living today, would probably agree with such progressive views- to Lowith's dismay. 
But Hegel ' s reasoning would be based on different premises than Teilhard's or Peck' s; and Hegel would 
also proffer a different interpretation of the final goal towards which human progress is moving. Hegel 
would also characterize Lowith' »Secularization hypothesis« as an unsubtle oversimplification of his ap-
proach, and resolutely deny that he had any intention to do away with Christian transcendence. To under-
stand why this is so, we have first to consider Hegel's rather unique general optimism about the interre-
lationship of Christianity and modem philosophy, and more specifically the power of philosophical concep-
tualization to bring out the true meaning of Christian dogmas. 
»The authority of the canonical faith of the church has been in part degraded, in part removed. The 
>symbolum< or >regula fidei< itself is no longer regarded as something totally binding but instead as 
something that has to be interpreted and explained from the Bible. But the interpretation depends on the 
spirit that explains. The absolute footing is just the concept. 5 To the contrary, by means of exegesis 
such basic doctrines of Christianity have been partly set aside and partly explained in quite lukewarm 
fashion. Dogmas such as those of the Trinity and the miracles have been put in the shadows by theo-
logy itself. Their justification and true affirmation can occur only by means of the cognizing spirit, and 
for this reason much more of dogmatics has been preserved in philosophy than in dogmatics or in 
theology itself as such.«6 
Hegel is here echoing Anselm's credo ut intelligam faith as the foundation for speculative philosophizing. 
The highest speculative truths are contained implicitly in Christian dogmas such as the Trinity; and philoso-
phy, or »Absolute Knowledge«, as Hegel observes in his 1807 Phenomenology,7 begins with the imagina-
tive, figurative truths of religion as an indispensable content which are imperfect only insofar as they still 
need to be elaborated into suitable rational/conceptual formulations . A major part of Hegel 's system of phi-
losophy is concerned precisely with such speculative elaboration of religious ideas. Thus Hegel describes 
his Phenomenology of Spirit as the »Golgotha of Absolute Spirit«,8 his Logic as conceptualization of the 
»life of God before the creation of the world«,9 and the political sections of his Philosophy of Right as »the 
march of God through the world.«lO Thus also Hegel ' s Philosophy of History is a rational/conceptual ela-
boration of the Christian concept of Divine Providence. Hegel states this in the initial sections of the Lectu-
res on the Philosophy of History, where he begins with a criticism of theologians. He cites the scriptural 
injunction that we should »know, love and serve God«, and then goes on to observe that 
»In recent times Philosophy has been obliged to defend the domain of religion against the attacks of 
several theological systems. In the Christian religion God has revealed Himself- that is, he has given 
us to understand what He is; so that He is no longer a concealed or secret existence. And this possibi-
lity of knowing Him, thus afforded us, renders such knowledge a duty . . God wishes no narrow-hear-
ted souls or empty heads for hls children; but those whose spirit is of itself indeed, poor, btit rich in the 
knowledge of Him; and who regard this knowledge of God as the only valuable possession. That de-
velopment of the thinking spirit, which has resulted from the revelation of the Divine Being as its ori-
ginal basis, must ultimately advance to the intellectual comprehension of what was presented in the first 
instance, to feeling and imagination.« 11 
Hegel then proceeds to apply this general optimism about the powers of human knowledge to the Christian 
doctrine of Divine Providence: 
H.P. Kainz, Hegel, Providence, and the Philosophy of History 185 · 
»The time must eventually come for understanding that rich product of active Reason, which the Hi-
story of the World offers to us. It was for awhile the fashion to profess admiration for the wisdom of 
God, as displayed in animals, plants, and isolated occurrences. But, if it be allowed that Providence 
manifests itself in such objects and forms of existence, why not also in Universal History? [ ... ]Our 
mode of treating the subject is [ ... ] a Theodicaea- a justification of the ways of God - which Leibniz 
attempted metaphysically, in his method, i.e. in indefinite abstract categories - so that the ill that is 
found in the World may be comprehended, and the thinking Spirit reconciled with the fact of the exis-
tence of evil. Indeed, nowhere is such a harmonizing view more pressingly demanded than in Univer-
sal History [ ... ]« 12 · 
Hegel thus considers it the function of a philosopher such as himself in Western Christian civilization to 
demonstrate the rationality of history - a rationality that is merely implicitly assumed by the theologians. 
And Hegelexplicitly differentiates his approach from a natural-history approach. Unlike Marx, Huxley, 
Nietzsche, Spengler and Spencer, who in very diverse ways tried to extrapolate the theory of organic evo-
lutionary progress into the social and cultural realms, Hegel, who explicitly rejects the possibility of physi-
cal evolution, 13 concerns himself with the specifically spiritual evolution of mankind. His philosophy of 
history, looking for the »Rose in the Cross« of history's past, for the essential rationality of historical 
reality, hypothesizes an ongoing evolution spearheaded in the development of the Concept of the State. The 
upward thrust of spiritual evolution, according to Hegel's theory, has to do with the gradual but inevitable 
emergence of human freedom in the modern state. He explains this in the Introduction to his Philosophy of 
History: 
»The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit- Man as such- is free; and because they do 
not know this, they are not free. They only know that one is free. [ ... ] That one is therefore only a 
Despot; not afree man. The consciousness of Freedom first arose among the Greeks, and therefore 
they were free; but they, and the Romans likewise, knew only that some are free - not man as such. 
Even Plato and Aristotle did not know this. The Greeks, therefore, had slaves [ ... ] The German na-
tions, under the influence of Christianity, were the first to attain the consciousness, that man, as man, 
is free; that it is the freecfom of Spirit which constitutes its essence. [ ... ] The History of the world is 
no.ne other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom; a progress whose development accor-
ding to the necessity of its nature, is our business to investigate.«l4 
»The Geiman nations, under. the influence of Christianity« [ ... ] Christianity? The harbinger of freedom? 
Hegel is of course at the antipode to Nietzsche's interpretation of Christianity as a »slave mentality.« 
Christianity in Hegel's interpretation, far from inducing a slave mentality, is the fundamental source for the 
emergence in historical consciousness of the concept of freedom. How does Hegel come to this conclusion? 
The »middle term« for this connection of Christianity with freedom is the unique emphasis in Christianity 
on subjectivity. The Christian idea of God as Absolute Being/Object, says Hegel, is expressly geared, in 
contrast to other religions, toaccommodate the subjective element. IS The Christian God is an absolute uni-
que, free, personal, subject. Thus the notion of »liberty«, in our modem sense of the word, did not even 
exist before Christianity came into the world.l6 Although the practice of slavery did not cease immediately 
in Christianity, 17 the idea that all human beings were equally free has been present in the world since the 
beginning of the Christian era. IS 
It is important to note, however, that the ascendancy of the world towards a greater extensivity of free-
dom did not imply, in Hegel's mind, a trend towards democracy. Hegel castigated democracy for offering 
only an incomplete and unsatisfactory »compromise« approach to the political affirmation of individual 
subjectivities. Democracies, Hegel observes, tend to construe universal subjective participation in politics in 
a quantitative rather than a qualitative fashion. Thus they oversimplify the complex task of assuring partici-
pation on all levels of society into the easier-to-attain ideal of »one man, one vote«.l9 Hegel's own ideal, to 
· which democracy is only an approximation, is »absolute freedom«,20 a paradoxical concept of freedom 
which Hegel borrows in part from Fichte. In a state of absolute freedom, individuals are not just free, but 
determine themselves to be free; that i , they build up constitutional incentives and safeguards so iron-tight 
that they almost, in Rousseau's words,jorce themselves to be free . 
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The political state which would achieve such a paradoxical goal would b.e one which managed, accor-
ding to the exigencies of the dialectical/speculative Concept, to unite nature and natural determinations with 
spirit and free choices. Hegel's candidate for such an ideal polity was, as is well-known, a constitutional 
monarchy somewhat like an idealized, reconstituted Prussian state, in which the royal line of succession 
would supply a stable »natural« foundation for the activities of spirit to be carried out by the legislative and 
executive branches of government, while the various classes of society and civil »corporations« (labor 
unions, professional organizations, etc.) would supply a constant and dependable »natural« resource for 
governmental representation in the Estates. 
Well, as is well-known, Hegel compared philosophy to the Owl of Minerva, which only came out at 
the end of day, looking back at the past, and having no privileged knowledge of the future. Hegel officially 
abjured prophecy, although he occasionally made some »off the record« guesses about what the future 
would hold - for example, his suggestion in the Philosophy of History that America would be the »land of 
the future«. But what if Hegel could be present now at the end of the twentieth century, and still have the 
benefit of the retrospective view which he thought to be so necessary to philosophy? Would he still adhere 
to his theory about the spiritual evolution towards freedom in history? How would he react to the almost 
universal demise of monarchies, even constitutional monarchies? In the wake of fascism and communism 
and the multiple genocides witnessed by our generation, would he be able to salvage his theory about the 
progression of freedom? 
Hegel was not adverse to revising his theories, when this was needed. For example, in the earlier and . 
later versions of his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, he revised his analyses of the syllogism in the 
Logic, and his categorization of the stages of religion in the Philosophy of Absolute Spirit. It is not incon-
ceivable that, as Klaus Hartmann suggests,21 he would rethink and revise the interconnection of his theory 
of historical progress with constitutional monarchy. The Hegelian free state could be salvaged, as long as 
union of nature and Spirit, essential to the idea of Absolute Freedom, could be maintained. The principal 
realphilosophische question Hegel would need to ask is, are the natural divisions of society and the diverse 
gifts and callings of human subjectivity adequately represented at the level of the higher echelons of go-
vernment? It is not inconceivable that he would find the contemporary Bundesrepublik Deutschland and 
other European social democracies to be exemplars spearheading the historical progession of the concept of 
freedom. 
But in the interests of the spiritual progress of mankind, would Hegel, even with the benefit of 20th 
century hindsight, ever be able to raise his sights beyond the parameters of the nation state? Probablynot. 
His trenchant nationalistic critique of the proposal for a League of Nations .in Kant's treatise on Perpetual 
Peace22 indicates quite clearly that Hegel, unlike Kant, did not conceive of any final development of Abso-
lute Freedom in the international sphere. No doubt Hegel's vision would grow dim when confronted with 
such challenges. But we should not fault Hegel, since we ourselves have similar difficulty in overcoming 
nationalistic blinders to grapple ~ith the immense complexity of moving beyond ethnic and racial and reli-
gious provincialism to incorporate freedom in the international sphere. 
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